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[Abstract] The Norwegian armed forces in the early 21st century is in a phase of rapid 
change and transition. International missions are about to become its main task, whereas 
traditional domestic territorial defence is becoming less and less relevant. 
Is this transition purely a technical adjustment to a new security environment, or does it also 
entail more fundamental changes in the relationship between the armed forces, the state and 
the population? Could the military risk to lose its popular legitimacy?
To grasp the current changes, it is important to understand the foundations of the relation-
ship between the military, the state and the people. As well as how these relations have 
evolved over time. This is certainly not the ﬁrst time in history the armed forces are facing 
fundamental changes. 
This article seeks to shed light on some of these developments in Norway over the last 
centuries. The evolvement of the conscript system will be used to illustrate some of these 
developments. I will argue that the Norwegian authorities to date have been reluctant in ad-
dressing the changes, applying what can be described as ‘yesterday’s explanations’ when 
legitimising military operations of today. If this trend of ignorance continues, the danger of a 
popular back-lash increases. 
Most of the empirical material as well as some analytical points in this article is
previously published in Norwegian, see Friis (1999). A shorter version of this article is published in 
Joenniemi (2005). All quotes are translated by the author.
Thanks to Pertti Joenniemi for comments and support, and a special thanks to Brigt Harr Vaage 
for all contributions on the latter part of the article. Without those this paper would not have been 
written.
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Introduction 
The Norwegian armed forces in the early 21st century is in a phase of rapid 
change and transition. International missions are about to become its main 
task, whereas traditional domestic territorial defence is becoming less and 
less relevant. Norwegian security interests are now apparently best secured 
abroad. 
Is this transition purely a technical adjustment to a new security environ-
ment, or does it also entail more fundamental changes in the relationship 
between the armed forces, the state and the population? Could the military 
risk to lose its popular legitimacy as operations in ‘exotic’ places become the 
rule rather than the exception? Does it risk losing touch with the society as it 
gradually is turning into a foreign policy tool? Can the people be expected to 
kill and die for something happening on another continent?  
These are indeed questions of utmost importance for any contemporary 
armed force. The modern armed forces in all Western countries are all tied to 
the wider society in one way or the other. It is resting on a certain level of 
legitimacy, stemming from the state itself as well as the population. But can 
this legitimacy always be taken for granted?  
To grasp the current changes, it is important to understand the founda-
tions of the relationship between the military, the state and the people. Fur-
thermore, it is necessary also to understand how these relations have evolved 
over time. This is certainly not the first time in history the armed forces are 
facing fundamental changes. The relationship between the military, the state 
and the people has been constantly evolving, sometimes dramatically. 
This article seeks to shed light on some of these developments in Norway 
over the last centuries. The evolvement of the conscript system will be used 
to illustrate some of these developments. This is because the most visible 
proof of the strong relationship between national Armies and the population 
is the conscript system, being as it is, based upon active involvement of, and 
general support from,  the civilian population. Without such, evasion would 
quickly become a problem, as seen in several other countries in times of cri-
sis throughout history.  
The aim of this article is to be better able to understand the current 
events, to grasp the magnitude of the changes, as well as pointing out which 
changes that have occurred before and which that are radically new today. I 
will argue that the Norwegian authorities to date have been reluctant in 
addressing these changes, applying what can be described as ‘yesterday’s 
explanations’ when legitimising military operations of today. If this trend of 
ignorance continues, the danger of a popular back-lash increases.  
Theoretical approach 
Throughout the 1990’s most academic studies on the Norwegian armed 
forces had one implicit ambition: to remind the politicians and the armed 
forces itself that the end of the Cold War required radical new thinking. The 
studies criticised the conservatism and the resistance to reform, and revealed 
how domestic and symbolic issues tended to have a more significant impact 
on Defence planning than did the new international environment. In this 
context, it was pointed out that the conscription system was a leftover from 
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the past, resting on some dubious ideas about the need to unite the nation 
rather than an effective way to defend the country (see e.g Neumann and 
Ulriksen, 1997).  
However the situation has changed considerably since the 1990’s. The 
armed forces are in many respect ahead of the political establishment as it 
has realised that international operations is the future. Broadly speaking, 
most of the military activity on Norwegian territory appears more and more 
to be preparation for international missions to come. The romantic references 
to the Second World War home resistance is long gone as the symbolic back 
bone of the army. In Nietzschean terminology, the Norwegian armed forces 
are about to become Warriors rather than just Soldiers.2   
This development cannot be explained by reference to domestic history, 
as the studies in the 1990’s did. Domestic conservatism and symbolism may 
explain delays in reform, but not why change is taking place now. At the 
same time, studies that seek to explain this by reference to the international 
security system alone, also have a problem explaining why this system is 
changing. (Neo-)Realist theories tend to take the international anarchy or 
structure for granted. They thus have problems adapting to an international 
security situation with non-state actors and where vaguely definitions of risk 
dominate the discourse. The Western world is not facing a territorial threat 
or a competing ideological force aspiration to world dominance. A security 
theory stuck in the world of ever competing similar states can neither grasp 
the magnitude nor the dynamics of these developments. The very definition 
of security threats and risks is what is contested today, and this can hardly be 
grasped with traditional realist theories.  
For the purpose of this article, I seek will seek to analyse the Norwegian 
security discourse with historical lenses. A loosely applied Foucauldian 
genealogy will be the approach.3 This means, at least in this context, a repre-
sentation of history that seeks to disclose the foundations, the givens, the 
deep structures in a society, acknowledging simultaneously that these struc-
tures are evolving. The point is to shed light on the dynamics of the current 
developments by demonstrating how various practices have evolved over 
time. Such an approach will therefore by necessity focus on the power rela-
tions that uphold and transform these structures. The aim is partly to demon-
strate that even the ‘givens’ the ‘foundations’ and even the ‘truths’ related to 
security, conscription and the armed forces  of today are historical constructs 
and therefore changing are bound to change again.  
A Clausewitz-inspired triangle of the people, state and army will be 
applied throughout the article to demonstrate the changes over history. This 
triangle will be applied as an analytical tool with the purpose of illustrating 
the shifting relationships of power and the legitimacy of the armed forces.  
                                                     
2 Nietzsche’s contempt for the conscript Army was famously summarised in the sentence ‘I 
see many soldiers, would that I saw many warriors’ in ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’. See 
Coker (2001:47pp) 
3 Loosely in the sense that the format of an article not provides enough space to apply a 
thorough genealogy in the Foucauldian fashion (see e.g. Foucault, 1997). However, even 
if the historical narratives presented are broad and somewhat superficial, I will 
nonetheless claim that most of the empirical material referred to here are widely 
acknowledged. My contribution is rather to re-present them in a different analytical 
setting.  
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I will also seek to demonstrate that various forms of power have been at 
play, from violent brute force to disciplinary societal structures, causing re-
sistance, patriotism and obedience. These days new power-constellations are 
about to emerge, forcing those seeking to apply military force to legitimise 
their reason for doing so in new ways. That may be a challenge. 
The Absolutist State – Pure Instrumental Power 
The State in the 16th – 18th Centuries 
From late in the 14th century and the following four centuries Norway was 
united with Denmark and basically ruled from Copenhagen. This was mainly 
a result of royal intermarriages at the time, rather than wars or strategic alli-
ances. Denmark was the economically and politically dominant partner for 
most of the period.  The level of direct rule from Copenhagen or indirect rule 
through representatives in Norway varied over the centuries, but at times 
Norway was considered as just another region in Denmark, like Jylland and 
Fyn (e.g.. under the rule of Christian III in the 16th century). Gradually, to-
wards the end of the 18th century, Norway developed its own laws, taxation 
system and bureaucracy. Nonetheless, as in Europe in general, compared to 
later standards the state was very weak indeed. The state rule in most of 
these centuries was limited to taxation, a few laws, and an occasional draft-
ing (Tilly, 1990). As the taxation also basically was aimed at financing wars 
and the army, the purpose of most state activities was limited to keeping the 
power.  
The peasants in Norway, who were under less harsh rule and control than 
most of their European counterparts at the time, nonetheless carried most of 
the burdens of the society, as they were the only ones to be drafted for mili-
tary service and were those who paid the highest taxes. 
The lack of centralised institutions, limited communications, no media 
and most importantly, no ideological idea of a ‘nation’, indicates that 
people’s identities and loyalties were local rather than national. The idea of a 
collective identity based upon a shared history, culture and language was 
hardly born, and certainly not established among the uneducated and illiter-
ate rural population.  
In the triangle of the people, state and army, the first category, the people, 
did not yet exist. That is to say, there were no ideology uniting people, no 
popular movement fighting for their rights and nobody representing them as 
a social category with collective rights and duties. Hence, the state, and later 
on the army, were the sole representatives of the polity that existed on what 
is today the Norwegian territory. 
The Military 
Even if nationally oriented historians have been attempting to write the his-
tory of conscription in Norway back to the 10th century, by referring to the 
so-called ‘leidang’, this represents a questionable anachronism. The ‘lei-
dang’ was for the most part a locally organised and exercised system of self-
protection in case of sudden attacks in the late Middle Ages. Communication 
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through a network of fires on mountaintops and dedicated warriors existed, 
but the system did not represent a standing army or a centrally organised 
force. They were all locally organised and remained as protectors of the local 
community. There are also several examples over the centuries of failed at-
tempts by the king to draft peasants for military adventures outside the home 
region of the peasants.  
This, as well as the technological development of the weaponry in the 
14th and 16th century made it more efficient to use mercenaries. They were 
financed through taxation of peasants, but it was unevenly exercised both in 
amount and frequency of paying. Hence, for centuries serving in the army 
was an unfamiliar and alien concept for most men in Norway.  
For example, during the Nordic Seven Years War (1563-1570), an at-
tempt was made to draft peasants to re-conquer the Trondheim area from the 
Swedes. However, threats of hanging were needed before an army could be 
scrambled. A few years later, in 1567, an attempt was made in Bergen to 
draft peasants to support Oslo which was conquered by the Swedes. Not un-
til five revolting peasant leaders were beheaded could an army be estab-
lished. (Bagge and Mykland, 1987:112)  
Also under the reign of Christian IV (1588-1648) an attempt was made to 
draft a large army to fight the Swedes. The attempt failed, and the level of 
evasion and the refusal to obey orders was so widespread, also among the 
officers, that the king realised that a more structured and permanent organ-
ised military was required. Until then, Norway did not have its own defence 
with country wide organisation, officers or General Staff.  
The draft up to this period took place whenever it was required by the 
king, it was not regulated by law or regulations, or in any way notified in 
advance to the draftees. No rule of law secured a fair and evenly distributed 
system of drafting, pure luck or accident could determine a peasants faith in 
this respect.  
 
The First Army Organisation  In the 17th and 18th century, this gradually 
changed. More laws were introduced, the judicial system improved, and the 
physical forceful exercise of power became less frequent. The form of gov-
erning gradually became regulatory rather than arbitrary.  
The first seed to a Norwegian army was sowed in 1628, when the so-
called ‘legd’ system was established. A ‘legd’ consisted of four farms of a 
certain size, and at least the central parts of the country were divided into 
such ‘legds’. Each ‘legd’ was required to produce one soldier for the king 
(Bagge and Mykland, 1987:139). In 1641 a Norwegian army was estab-
lished, thus becoming the first state institution of modern times in Norway. 
The reason was instrumental; experience from the 30 Year’s War proved that 
ad hoc drafted armies were inferior to the better trained ones. In other words, 
the troops needed more practice.  
This was a period with several confrontations between Denmark-Norway 
and Sweden, but despite the improved organisation, the discipline among the 
drafted peasants remained low. However, exercise of the draftees was intro-
duced also in peacetime, first on Sunday after mass, later once a month. The 
‘legds’ remained the backbone of the system, and the soldiers remained in 
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their local area when exercising. Hence, the burden was not too heavy on 
them.  
In 1705 the first thoroughly organised draft authority was established, the 
so-called ‘Sessionsvæsen’ (Nåvik, 1996:55). A new law was introduced 
which demanded that two farms now had to equip a soldier, and it was ille-
gal to lease a farm before the military duty was served. It also prescribed life 
imprisonment or execution in case of desertion during war, but the punish-
ment was less harsh in peacetime. Historical records of the Danish-Norwe-
gian army in the 18th century describes, among other things, that ‘desertion 
was punished with such beating that it often led to death’ (Vaupell, 
1876:10).  
The more organised and structured organisation of the army and the draft 
was an attempt to ease the tensions between privates and officers and 
thereby avoid the evasion. Still, the law was never fully implemented, and 
the use of force remained arbitrary.  
Similarly, when the army encountered problems in drafting because the 
peasant-sons simply left their farms to evade drafting, so-called ‘stavnsbånd’ 
was introduced in 1733. It meant that peasants or their sons not could move 
from their farms until they were 40 years of age (Nåvik, 1996:85; Vaupell, 
1876:232). This decree remained until 1799 when drafting became an indi-
vidual plight.  
The Power 
Throughout most of this period, the King and his noblemen remained the 
sole representatives of the state and the Danish-Norwegian polity. The armed 
forces gradually became better organised and an institution in itself, but the 
people were still ‘unorganised’. The state power at the end of the 18th cen-
tury still was top-down, from the king to his subjects, even if indirect 
through the government officials and army officers. Hence, the power was 
open and instrumental, it was forceful and arbitrary, clearly discernible in 
terms of locus and focus. It was the king and his noblemen that possessed the 
power. This power was rarely exercised though, people seldom felt the inter-
ference in their daily lives. When it was applied however, like in drafting, it 
was harsh and demanding and could demand loyalty and sacrifice for months 
or years (nobody knew in advance of course). The power was in the hands of 
the elites, and the ‘stavnsbånd’ system certainly represented a thorough ex-
ercise of power over the peasants.  
Put bluntly, peasants were forced to serve in the army, the draft system, 
and the army, was generally not legitimate from the draftee peasant’s point 
of view. It was highly unpopular. As a result, the struggle over the draft at 
this time was often visible and physical. It was a struggle between ruler and 
subjects, between individuals who resisted draft and taxation, and the ruling 
power. It was a violent struggle and a violent army. There was no standing 
army, it was only scrambled in times of war, and did nothing outside fighting 
wars.  
Nonetheless, a more predictable, regulating and less physical form of rule 
was emerging. The regulated military draft system proved more efficient 
than the old arbitrary system and gradually reduced the need for physical 
Karsten Friis 
nupi february 06 
10 
punishment. This trend continued in the 19th century as the state grew 
stronger and entered more spheres of people’s lives.  
This, it could be argued, abolished the struggle altogether, since a ‘social 
contract’ was established between the ruler and his subjects, legitimising the 
state and thereby the draft. I will rather argue that the power struggle re-
mained intact in the emerging modern state, but rather than displaying itself 
visually and violently, it began taking other forms that were far less visible.  
The Liberal State – The birth of conscription as an idea 
The 19th Century State 
 
At the dawn of the 19th century, Norway did not exist as a realm of its own. 
Its territorial administration and organisation of counties, military command 
regions, judicial areas were all highly integrated into the Danish government 
administration (Bagge and Mykland, 1987:254). That however, did not mean 
that the public sphere had shrunk, only that all the central institutions were 
located in Copenhagen and not in Oslo. 
The four century long Danish-Norwegian unified state nonetheless ended 
abruptly, but that was as a result of the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, 
and not domestic developments in Norway. Denmark was then forced to 
abstain Norway to Sweden as war compensation after having been allied 
with Napoleon. Even if the small Norwegian intelligentsia was taken some-
what off guard, with the help and initiative of the Danish Prince Christian 
Fredrik, Norwegian officials, noblemen and other representatives hastily met 
at a manor in Eidsvold north of Oslo, to draft a Norwegian Constitution in 
1814. By exploiting this window of opportunity, Norway did regain some of 
its international subjectivity and was legally equal to Sweden in the new 
Union that was created. A parliament and a government were also estab-
lished. Not surprisingly, the Constitution was highly influenced by the 
French Enlightenment ideas as well as the American Constitution, and was 
rather liberal in contemporary standards. As a result, the Norwegian state 
was for the first time resting on a set of political-philosophical ideas which 
put the sovereignty and equality of the people as its legal basis. Of course, as 
in the rest of Europe, noble thoughts were far from reflecting the realities on 
the ground, and the liberal ideas that prevailed in the following decades did 
not encourage a strong interventionist state to implement the ideas of equal-
ity.  
In a famous phrase the historian Jens Arup Seip (1963) has labelled this 
period the ‘State of the Government Official’, indicating where the real 
power was located. He argues that from 1814 to 1884, Norway was ruled by 
the bureaucrats. French revolution, Enlightenment and liberal ideas aside, 
the power remained in the hand of the few. Nonetheless, compared to earlier 
times the rule of law was established as a basic fundament for ruling, and the 
exercise of power was less arbitrary, uneven and physical than before. There 
were simply limits to what these state officials could do in the name of the 
state.  
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In the second half of 19th century the Norwegian government also in-
volved itself in numerous new spheres just the same way as most European 
governments did. Regulation of the fisheries, expanded taxation, trade laws, 
development of infrastructure and the like, gradually became a state interest. 
For instance, from 1851 to 1884 the public spending increased from 13 to 41 
million ‘Kroner’, in other words a threefold increase (Try, 1979:474). The 
state’s role as investor also rose, and passed 10% of the national total in the 
1870’s (Hodne, 1981:300f). The second half of the century also witnessed 
enormous socio-economical changes. Massive emigration to America, rap-
idly growing industrialisation, urbanisation, commercialisation and moderni-
sation of the farming, all had huge impact on the society at large.  
The first nation-wide organisations emerged, for the most part rural 
movement hostile to the modernisation process. The main one was the lib-
eral-rural movement that challenged both the modernisation in general and 
the power of the ruling state officials in particular (Nordby, 1991). Slowly 
and over the decades the representation in the parliament was altered as a 
growing number of peasants entered, increasingly rising their voice against 
the alien culture and activity of the academics, state officials and other repre-
sentatives of the new era. Gradually this opposition united, gained influence, 
and managed to make the parliament the main political institution at the ex-
pense of the king and the government, most notably by the introduction of 
the parliamentary system in 1884.  
The liberal-rural movement later emerged into the first Norwegian politi-
cal party, ‘Venstre’ in 1884. ‘Venstre’s’ ideological foundation would also 
prove important for the development of the Norwegian national identity as 
well as for the development within the armed forces, both of which were key 
factors for the Norwegian independence from Sweden in 1905. Moreover, 
‘Venstre’ was the first main contender of the definition of the Norwegian 
polity. ‘Venstre’ begun carrying a force which was about to become the 
Clausewitzian ‘people’, a power that would later re-define both the military 
as well as the state.  
The People: The Construction of a Nation 
The larger material and physical societal changes the above described mod-
ernisation-process represented, was crucial for the changes to come, but is 
not in itself sufficient to understand the dynamics of the new power struc-
tures. Whereas the modernisation of the state somewhat eased the former 
conflicts between the ruler and the ruled, between the military and the draft-
ees, it did not alter the basic picture. People were still dominated by the state. 
Hence, in the context of this article, the emergence of a Norwegian 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991), i.e. a national identity and solidar-
ity comprising the entire territory, would turn out to become an equally im-
portant form of power in the years leading up to the independence in 1905. 
The gradually spreading popular belief in a national identity and a national 
solidarity brought something qualitatively new into the state: its popular le-
gitimacy.  
The Norwegian nationalism was inspired by the wave of Romanticism 
and the so-called ‘National awakenings’ that swept Europe in the 19th cen-
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tury. The very idea of a nation, of a united people on a territory, of insiders 
and outsiders, of the cultural traits that defined the nation was, as it devel-
oped in Europe, relatively easy to adapt to Norway, as the population was 
rather stable and had limited influx of people of radically different languages 
or customs. In short, the drawing of the political and geographical borders of 
Self and Others was practicable task for those who set out to do this.  
The first expressions of nationalism emerged already in the first half of 
the 19th century (Aarnes, 1980). The urban population then begun seeking 
their national roots, and claimed to find them in the rural population. The 
Norwegian peasant and his culture were praised as the ‘real’ Norwegian, and 
selections of the rural cultures was represented to the urban audience. The 
rural peasant cultures were used as a dwell from which national symbols 
could be selected, picked and used by the urban nationalists with the aim of 
establishing their own cultural heritage. The peasant himself was let out.  
Importantly, modern science was used in this process. For instance 
Asbjørnsen and Moe, two folklorists, systematically zigzagged the valleys of 
the countryside writing down fairytales and stories. They were inspired by 
the German Romanticism, the Grimm brothers’ and the idea that the nation 
was some sort of a biological-historical organism with its own ‘folk-soul’ 
which needed to be preserved (Aarnes, 1980:141). 
Other scientists collected and systematised various objects, such as fur-
niture, tools, cloths and even houses. They were scientifically categorised, 
studied and placed in museums and exhibitions with the aim of ‘preserving 
the roots’. Also the language was collected. The linguist Ivar Aasen toured 
the country for years writing down dialects and expressions. With the help of 
modern grammatical rules he then established an alternative written lan-
guage which were ‘pure Norwegian’ and not Danish as was the commonly 
used written language. Aasen was explicit: ‘We never need to cross the bor-
ders for a language; we can search our own turf and see what we possess 
before we begin borrowing from others’ (quoted in Nerbøvik, 1994:144).  
These processes of representations, of a romantic search for the Norwe-
gian ‘core culture’ and the application of highly modern scientific methods 
all sought to draw an identity border that matched the state border. The use 
of scientific methods functioned as a way of de-politicise the process. The 
search for the national heritage was considered ‘natural’ and ‘objective’ and 
not explicitly political, even if was all about drawing a border between Nor-
wegians and Others. The growing national emotions and patriotism towards 
the end of the century leading to the break-up of the Union in 1905 would 
have been impossible without this ‘ammunition’, working hand in hand with 
the growing influence of ‘Venstre’, the state expansion and the wider socio-
economical development. Most importantly in this context, it made a Nor-
wegian army possible. 
The Military 
Conscription in the Constitution  An important change in the system of 
drafting emerged in 1799 when military duty became an individual plight, 
not any more the duty of a group of farms (the ‘legd’). In the previous sys-
tem it was entirely up to these farms to decide who should represent them, 
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whereas the state now addressed the individual directly. It also made the 
state’s exercise of power somewhat less arbitrary than before. However, it 
also implied an increased control by the state over its subjects. It could now 
track every single (male) and pick and chose as it pleased. Still, this did not 
mean general conscription. The system only applied to the inland peasants, 
not the costal population, and of the former only a limited number of men 
actually were drafted (Nåvik, 1996:90).  
The fact that the state now was technically capable of running a register 
of males, itself a sign of an emerging modernity within the state organisa-
tion, was an important precondition for what should turn out to be an im-
portant feature of the 1814 Constitution; the inclusion of conscription as a 
male duty. The text of paragraph 109 in the Constitution read: ‘Any Citizen 
of the state in obliged to serve a certain time to protect the Fatherland, irre-
spective of birth or wealth’. The majority of the representatives at the Con-
stitutional Assembly considered the conscription to be the very symbol and 
incarnation of the equality and the sovereignty of the people. It also had to 
be a duty for all (i.e. conscription not only draft) since the entire foundation 
of the Constitution was based upon this sovereignty of the Norwegian 
people. This foundation needed to be substantiated, and by including it in the 
Constitution it was underlined or even ‘proven’ than Norway was a unity 
apart from Sweden and Denmark, and that all the (male) citizens were in-
cluded and supportive. This way the people was formally bound to the state 
and the military for the first time.  
Still, nobody interpreted the conscription literally; the urban population 
and academics were explicitly exempted, and everybody were allowed to 
provide a substitute if it did not suit them to serve personally. In other words, 
despite a new legal framing it continued to be a draft system. In 1816 a law 
was passed that was supposed to implement the Constitutionally defined 
conscription. The result was rather opposite: the army was reduced from 
35000 to 12000 men, of which 2000 should be contracted. Only the number 
of recruits necessary to fill the ranks were drafted, and there were no reserv-
ists. The rest were exempted. In effect, fewer men did military service after 
1816 than in the 18th century. 
The military was also used in operations abroad on several occasions. 
Most notably the Navy, but also the army was deployed in e.g. Slesvig-Hol-
stein in 1848 (Ulriksen, 2002). This indicates that even if the people for-
mally were a part of the state-military nexus, it was not at the time repre-
sented as something utterly connected to the Norwegian territory, as it would 
be later. 
Furthermore, there are clear indications that a harsh discipline was still 
needed to keep the draftees under control. The military penal code of 1850 
was the most detailed regulation of the disciplinary system in the military to 
that date, and it applied less physical punishment than before. Still, terms 
like ‘dark prison’, ‘lonely prison’, ‘prison with water and bread’, ‘penal ser-
vitude’ and to some extent ‘death penalty’ was still in use. However, whip-
ping or cane beating was from then on only allowed on board ships or in the 
field when ordinary punishment not could be accomplished.  There were 
specific rules that applied to mutiny and revolt, and severe punishment for 
evasion also in peacetime. This indicates that it still was a challenge to enrol 
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and discipline the recruits. The state power had become more regulatory than 
forceful, but the use of force was far from abolished.  
The state and the armed forces remained strong and united institutions 
way into the second half of the 19th century, representing the same polity. 
The people, if formally a part of the ‘contract’, remained absent as a political 
force to be reckoned with. 
 
The Liberal-Rural Movement and the Armed Forces  Within the liberal-rural 
movement the scepticism towards the armed forces was high. The army, in 
their eyes, was the symbol of the King, of the upper classes and the alien 
government officials. The liberal-rural movement begun rising their voice 
against this more thoroughly as their influence grew in the second half of the 
century. They regarded the Officers and the military as representatives of an 
alien culture and power, the Officers had sworn loyalty to the King, not the 
people, and were therefore not representatives of the people. The military 
was regarded as anti-liberal and associated with authoritarian regimes like 
the Prussian. The leading figure of the movement Johan Sverdrup expressed 
scepticism towards the ‘soldier spirit’ which he feared would conflict with 
the ‘civil spirit’ if a six months’ military service was to be introduced as 
suggested for the first time in 1866 (NMT, 1927:961). He said that ‘…the 
garrison life never could be a good school for the youth’ (quoted in Kristian-
sen, 1966:33). Sverdrup wanted a different military, a military that was an-
chored locally and in the people, and which not was segregated from the 
civil society.  
The movement even establish their own alternative quasi- or para-mili-
tary organisation, called the ‘People’s Armament’. These were formally 
sporting clubs or a sort of rifle clubs, but their close association with the lib-
eral-rural political movement made them a power tool for the latter. During 
the peak of the conflict with the King and government in 1884, when the 
parliamentary system was introduced and ‘Venstre’ established, these clubs 
were strongly present as they were urged to establish a defending ring 
around the parliament. These forces represented a (in the movement’s eyes) 
far more legitimate army than the official one. 1884 represented a turning-
point as a political movement of the people had gained control over a main 
state institution (the parliament). This became a platform for the continued 
struggle for the realisation of its vision of the Norwegian polity, a vision that 
certainly diverged from the one held by the King in Stockholm. The change 
in 1884 also had an impact on the military.  
Already in 1887 a new army organisation was introduced, highly fla-
voured by the strength of ‘Venstre’. Troops dedicated to the national-territo-
rial defence were strengthened at the expense of the troops that also were 
deployable abroad, and contracted troops were abolished. Already a decade 
earlier, the joint exercises with the Swedish troops had ended. The national-
territorial ideal of ‘Venstre’ was closer to realisation. ‘Venstre’ kept arguing 
for the inclusion of the ‘People’s Armament’ into the military, to strengthen 
the civil spirit. This was harshly opposed by the officers who claimed that 
discipline, hierarchy and a division between privates and officers were cru-
cial for an army to be efficient.  
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However, this mood within the officers in the armed forces changed 
rather rapidly in 1895. Norway had been demanding from Sweden a separate 
international Consular Service, due to the huge shipping industry. When this 
demand was met with Swedish mobilisation and threats of military reprisals, 
the Norwegian defence budget was increased significantly. Fortresses were 
built along the border, the Navy got new ships and the conscription period 
was increased from 9 to 14 years. At the same time, the Ministry of Defence 
gradually took over the control of the armed forces from the King in Swe-
den. The younger generation of Officers were also much more nationally 
oriented than the older, and these begun to fill more important positions 
within the military. The common perception of Sweden as a potential enemy, 
as an Other, therefore functioned to change the armed forces internally as 
well as legitimise it in the civil society.  
The growing national emotions, the de-politicised and ‘natural’ national 
spirit had begun taking hold in the wider part of the population, and the mo-
ment the military was accepted and included in this represented a watershed 
in the national development. Gradually ‘Venstre’ abandoned the demand for 
the ‘People’s Armament’ knowing that a modern army needed more profes-
sional training and equipment. As long as the military was national and not 
representing the Other, these movements again became just sports and rifle 
clubs, whereas the military was included as part of the national discourse.  
If we compare the military penal codes of 1850 and 1902, we see that the 
latter had become even more detailed, but that the punishment had become 
less physical. The use of whip was abolished, and evasion was only punished 
by imprisonment, also at times of war. Capitol punishment was limited to the 
most exceedingly aggravating circumstances at times of war (Militær Straf-
felov, 1902). The need for use of force to discipline the troops was appar-
ently rarely required. The men in uniform were simply more motivated. 
They had a cause.  
Hence, for the first time in history, the military was representing the 
people rather than just the state. As a matter of fact, it became opposed to the 
state, represented by the Swedish authorities, and loyal to the Norwegian 
authorities that claimed to be representing the people. 
 When the Union with Sweden dissolved in 1905, Norwegian patriotism 
was at a boiling point. There were concerns of war, but the optimism and 
self confidence was dominant. Prime Minister Christian Michelsen said for 
example: ‘The situation was that the independence of the country and Con-
stitution had to be protected, no matter the price. I heard no fear of war’ 
(quoted in Gulbranson 1936:239). Also, when later explaining about the ne-
gotiations with Sweden the then Prime Minster Jørgen Løvland said: ‘During 
the negotiations we knew that the spirit in the Norwegian army was excel-
lent, we knew, that from the officers to the privates there was courage, will 
to sacrifice…’ (quoted in Gulbranson, 1936:239). Even if the Norwegian 
mobilised army was only 23000 men, and the Swedes were twice as many, 
he did not fear a Swedish invasion in case the negotiations failed, because 
the ‘will to defence’ was so strong in Norway (Berg, 1995:35). The union 
was dismantled in a peaceful way (only a few shots were fired), and Norwe-
gian self confidence was bolstered. In a referendum 99.9 % of the partici-
pants voted in favour of independence. 
Karsten Friis 
nupi february 06 
16 
With the armed forces as the very symbol of the nation, conscription was 
not only accepted and normalised, it had become the realisation of the lib-
eration, of the free will of the people: ‘We are one people, one country, one 
soul, one will, and that is: Now Norway shall  be free, free, free! There is 
only one heartbeat in the entire people’ wrote Captain Angell (1905:7). Fur-
thermore: ‘To give, to sacrifice, to suffer for a holy cause - that brings pleas-
ure, sincere, deep felt; we feel closely united, strongly together, the ‘father-
land’ is no longer an empty word, it becomes like God himself. And the fight 
for the fatherland, that becomes the ‘holy war’ the fulfilment of Gods Fourth 
Commandment’ (Angell, 1905:31f). Captain Angell was a central person in 
the national movement for the enlightenment of the people at the time, and 
his patriotism typical for the emotions of 1905 (Strøm, 1995).  
The Power 
Compared to the earlier times, the 19th century witnessed a revolutionary 
development in the relationship between the population and the armed 
forces. From being an institution in the hands of the king and government, it 
became the very institution carrying the spirit of the people. From being a 
top-down power instrument it became a bottom-up liberation movement. 
The perception was that the power was with the people, they had liberated 
themselves from both Danes and Swedes, and were finally free.  
The peak of the nationalist era, the independence in 1905, was considered 
‘natural’, a ‘right’ and ‘liberation’. The power was considered more democ-
ratically founded, it was bottom-up rather than top-down.  
However, never had the state interfered more in everyday life of its citi-
zens, never had it regulated more, demanded more taxes or had as widely 
applied draft system. The ‘liberation’ therefore, was not on an individual, but 
on a collective level. The ‘Norwegian people’ had ‘freed’ themselves and 
joined the international order of nation states. 
The key here is not if this was a ‘true’ interpretation of the events, what 
matters is that this was a commonly held view. Further, the aim is not to ‘re-
veal’ the power of domination ‘really’ was somewhere else (in the control of 
the upper classes or something else), but to indicate that the power nexus 
which upheld the idea of liberation was a strong one, ‘true’ or not. The 
power in this system was not one of class domination, or hierarchical domi-
nation, but a discursive one. It was a mix of theories (the sovereignty of the 
people), of political practice (the liberal-rural movement), the socio-eco-
nomical development (industrialisation, state expansion), the international 
developments, and organisation of the armed forces. 
The result of this was that individual men in Norway considered legiti-
mate to be a soldier, and hence to mobilise and possibly fight, kill and die for 
the state and the nation without being forced to do so. That was a revolution-
ary development.  
The national-patriotic representation of the people had prevailed, by first 
defining the Nation, then redefined the legitimate fundament of the army, 
and finally conquered the state itself. Some term this liberation, I choose to 
define it as a new set power-constellations. It was nonetheless not to last for 
very long. 
The State, the People and the Armed Forces 
nupi february 06 
17 
The Early 20th Century; Contested Security Perceptions 
The State and Nation 
The national honeymoon of 1905 should turn out to be short lived. The old 
political differences remained and new ones were emerging and again re-
politisising the national symbols. The lack of a basic political consensus in 
the first decades of the century threatened the entire political system, as ‘the 
nation-state not was an overreaching frame of identity for Norwegian citi-
zens’ (Fure, 1996:27). 
The liberation struggle from Sweden had united the people, but few were 
interested in engaging in any other international relations or conflicts. Al-
ready in 1905 Foreign Minister Jørgen Løvland said, ‘...we will not have any 
foreign policy’, meaning that Norway should seek to avoid being involved in 
international crisis and wars, but solely protect its neutrality. The focus was 
domestic and no new enemy was uniting the people. 
But the state expanded. The first years of the new century witnessed an 
industrial boom, modernisation in production and farming, urbanisation and 
a rapidly growing labour class. It soon became apparent that the traditional 
passive, liberal state not was suited for the new challenges. This became 
most evident during World War I when high inflation but limited resources 
forced the government to take action. A programme so interventionist that it 
was later labelled by Furre (1982) as ‘War Communism’, introduced food 
rationing, price regulation and import control, whereas the national budget 
was expanded with 50% from 1913 to 1918,  (Furre, 1982:90). 
In the 1920’s the state also continued the nation building programmes it 
had initiated before the dissolution of the Union. Public titles, places, the 
written language were all altered to become ‘more Norwegian’ and ‘less 
Danish’.4 The government introduced a unified and nationally oriented 
education system and invested in infrastructure that contributed in uniting 
the people. 
Still, this was not enough to keep the people together. The industrialisa-
tion brought numerous new political parties on the stage; National Patriotic 
parties, Christian-Democrats and of course labour parties. To a large extent 
these parties diverged not only over policy and the organisation of the state, 
but also when it came to national identity. They had different positions about 
what the national was, who it was and where the social borders were to be 
drawn. ‘When people said Norway they meant very different things’ writes 
Dahl (1975:24). It was a fight over who and what that should represent the 
nation, the Self, as well as over who and what the Other was.  
The Labour Party and the National  
Despite the international failure to unite against the emerging war in 1914, 
the working class movement and the Labour parties remained strong in the 
1920’s, not least after the Russian revolution in 1917. The Norwegian La-
bour Party was a radical party. It was anti-militaristic and anti-national and 
rejected and scorned the ‘bourgeois’ national symbols, such as the flag, the 
                                                     
4 The 400 years with Denmark had left more linguistic and cultural traits than the 90 years 
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national anthem or the Constitutional day (Dahl, 1975:29). The traditional 
romantic, retroactive nationalism was rejected as it was considered irrelevant 
for the emerging class struggle. Leading ideologist deemed the entire con-
cept of a ‘nation’ as passé, predicting it would disappear when the class-war 
was over. 
Not all labour leaders considered the nation as dead, however, some 
claimed that what was needed was rather to ‘renew the national identity and 
give it positive contents’ (Koht quoted in Dahl, 1969:27). They argued that 
the nationalism as represented by the right-wing parties not was the real na-
tionalism, since it was flavoured by the narrow interest of the ruling class. 
The national ideas had to be conquered by the labour class and the peasants, 
it was argued. Hence, the struggle within the labour movement was over the 
representation of the national. Should they reject the national identity en-
tirely or conquer the symbols and renew them? 
As labour grew and formed government from the mid-1930’s on, it be-
came less radical, making the latter option prevail. This implied a return to 
the state as the main frame for identity in contrast to an international frame. 
The party went from being a revolutionary class party to become a national 
party, seeking not a revolutionary change of system, but a different govern-
ment policy. The slogan ‘All the people at work’ signified this change, the 
party spoke on behalf of all Norwegians, not only the industrial working 
class, it wanted jobs, not revolution (Dahl, 1969:68). Hence, the labour party 
begun using the Norwegian flag and singing the national anthem on Labour 
Day and on other occasions. The labour had conquered the national symbols, 
but nonetheless also changed itself over the years, moving closer to some of 
the democratic values the national symbols represented, values that not had 
been highlighted to the same extent in the right-wing representation of the 
national symbols. 
Another development which contributed in turning the Labour party to-
wards a more national platform was the rise of fascism in Germany. This 
made it clear to the labour movement that the most threatening Other was 
not the brownish Norwegian parties but another state, even if the confronta-
tions with the former continued. Hence, it was an international Other, a 
threat from the international arena that emerged. Until then, the international 
scene had been more or less ignored in Norway.  
The Struggle over the Military 
That the nation not was a unifying concept in the 1920’s is clearly illustrated 
with the emergence of several para-military organisations that reflected the 
political opponents. There were ‘red’ and ‘white’ guards, partly organised in 
a military manner, partly armed with side arms (Ørvik, 1961). Some, like the 
‘Society Aid’ and the ‘Society Guard’ were so-called ‘emergency’ groups 
organised by the right-wing parties, prepared to mobilise in case of war or 
revolution. The ‘Society Aid’ became quasi-public and was supposed to 
support the police and organise strike-breakers. Another, more militant 
group called the ‘Society Guard’, became a reserve police force in 1927, an 
emergency support in case of demonstrations by the working class. Later a 
special organisation was established by the right-wing Minster of Defence, 
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Vidkun Quisling, which was supposed to train and educate volunteers for the 
rear defence, as well as support the training of the conscripts and give people 
‘enthusiasm for the armed forces’. 
The Labour party, which had been pacifistically oriented since before 
World War One, broke with this ideology in the 1930’s and organised ‘La-
bour Protection Groups’ to counter the various organisation on right-wing 
side. The Labour was fearing that the rightist parties were preparing for a 
domestic violent show-down.  
When the national high court banned the ‘Labour Protection Groups’ in 
1933 it did not improve the mutual confidence, not least in the light of the 
growth of fascism throughout Europe. This made the Labour movement 
unite tighter. 
The labour party had a deep lack of confidence in the armed forces, 
claiming that the officers and the organisation at large were controlled by the 
Others, i.e. the upper classes. From 1906 the party wanted disarmament of 
the military. This was partly due to the pacifistic currents within the party, 
partly the revolutionary ideas, since most officers were of middle-class 
background and many belonged on the political right-wing.  
Few doubted that the military could and would be used domestically, to 
support the police if so required, and there were several historical examples 
of such activity. In the 1920’s the army was mobilised at several strikes and 
confrontations between workers and the police. Even if few shots were fired 
at these mobilisations, the very presence of the army in full combat gear at 
strikes sent a very clear political signal about where it belonged politically 
(Furre, 1982; Hoel, 1966; Strømme, 1978).  
The Labour party suggested in 1933 to replace the existing armed forces 
with a ‘neutrality guard’ (Ørvik, 1961). The aim was to establish a ‘more 
democratic army’ to recruit officers from the wide public, and to get rid of 
the untrustworthy officers. The parallel to the scepticism of ‘Venstre’ 50 
years earlier is striking. The army did not reflect the people, as represented 
by the labour movement at the time.  
It was also believed that international arbitration could end a possible 
occupation quickly, making military resistance against the big powers un-
necessary.  In 1923 the military service was only 38 days, and in 1926 a lot-
tery system was introduced, revealing 1/3 off their duty. From 1920 to 1933 
the defence budget was halved.  
The political strains in the population were therefore very visible within 
the armed forces. There were different perceptions about who was Self and 
who was Other. Was the Other another social class or another state? If the 
latter, was it Germany or the Soviet Union? If the former, or a combination, 
who could be trusted nationally in case of an alien invasion? Would the 
right-wing rise against a German aggression or would labour resist the 
Soviet Union? The distrust was indeed deep.  
The radical downsizing of the military budgets and the number of draft-
ees probably reduced the chances of an armed confrontation between the 
various socio-political groups in Norway. The military became a relatively 
peripheral institution in the Norwegian society, thereby avoiding being the 
main field for confrontations between the groups.  
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Not until 1937, when the Labour party had conquered the national sym-
bols as well as established a more nationally oriented platform, did the de-
fence budget again increase. Then Franco had already won the Civil War in 
Spain, and Austria was annexed by Hitler. States were interpreted as the 
main actors in international politics and fascism the predominant ideological 
enemy. In 1940 Norway was occupied by Germany. 
The Power 
The people that were united and ’liberated’ in 1905 were split in competing 
visions of itself a few years later. The mutual distrust between the labour 
movement and the bourgeoisie due to their radically different representations 
of Self and Others, of threat and security as well as the international system, 
threatened to undermine the common state institutions.  
The impact on the armed forces was significant, at least when it came the 
competing interpretations of its role and function. The various para-military 
groups indicate a serious lack of trust in the state as the sole provider of se-
curity.  
If the people had felt liberated in 1905, these developments demonstrated 
that the power-relationships between social groups and classes continued to 
evolve, and that even national ideas are open for various interpretations and 
power-struggles. 
When the Labour party turned national in the mid-1930’s, it somehow 
symbolises the beginning of the end of some of these power-struggles. The 
labour movement identified itself as a national rather than international 
movement. It represented Norway, which was a subject in the international 
order of states. This order, it was to be discovered, could not be ruled by 
arbitrations, as the international system was now considered to be anarchical, 
and nobody could chose to remain outside the games at play. 
At the same time the Labour party had redefined the national, the people, 
in a more modern and future-focussed fashion. The armed forces were 
nonetheless the last institution to gain trust from the labour. Whereas the 
state and the people gradually were establishing a new modality in their 
power-relationship, the military was not included in this until after 1945.  
Cold War Norway: A Unified Security Discourse 
The Creation of a Nation-State  
The international economical growth and industrial boom after the Second 
World War was significant in Norway as in the rest of Europe. The state ex-
panded, economically, institutionally and politically. A collective spirit of 
solidarity and future optimism was accompanying the intensive investment 
in industry and infrastructure after the war. The first aim was to re-build 
what the war had destroyed, the second to modernize the country. Keynesian 
social economical planning and intensive public investment helped both 
aims being realised. The industrial sector developed rapidly, contributing to 
an economical growth without any significant set-backs from 1945 to the 
international oil-crisis in 1973. 
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Politically the Labour party had absolute majority in the parliament al-
most without interruption from 1945 till 1965. The state took charge, it im-
proved life for the vast majority of citizens, provided infrastructure, educa-
tion and healthcare. The state was more or less run by the Labour Party, 
leaving limited space for opposition, and creating a sometimes blurry dis-
tinction between party and state. However, the political climate had changed 
dramatically since the 1930’s. There was an immense, and historically 
unique, national consensus over key issues. 
The experience of the 1920’s and 30’s, when the people had been split to 
such an extent that the defence from foreign threats was neglected (at least 
that was a predominant interpretation after the Second World War), made 
national consolidation a key priority for the government. This had already 
begun in the late 1930’s but the spirit in the post-war era was well suited for 
nation-building as well as state-building. A united people that regarded itself 
as one nation, who shared the main values and societal goals, were actively 
promoted by the state. A massive nation-building programme was initiated, 
including the egalitarian educational system, cultural policy, the national 
media, the district and regional policy, and more or less all other projects the 
state was involved in. This way the socio-economical gap between the 
classes was decreased significantly and a political stable environment cre-
ated. Domestic stability was regarded a key to security, both internally and 
against international threats.  
The Nation-building discourse met little resistance until at last the 
1970’s, when the radical left forces grew. The national symbolism and ide-
ology of the nation state continued as before the war; in a strong belief in 
modernity, in industrialisation and progress. The Norwegian national iden-
tity looked to the future, not the past. 
Importantly, the united Self was also strengthened by a common Other, 
the communists (Furre, 1991). Especially in the early years after the War 
were the Norwegian communists considered a challenge to the very founda-
tions of the Labour Party. They were opposing its recipe for a prosperous 
society, they challenged the national identity (as defined by the majority at 
the time) and generally the widespread socio-political consensus. They were 
Others on the Inside, and considered potential traitors in case of war. As the 
Cold War settled theses groups remained marginal, and the main security 
focus was abroad. The Soviet Union became the dominant security threat in 
the discourse, a threat few questioned. As such it served the role Sweden did 
prior to 1905, it united the nation. 
However, this acknowledgment of the danger of potential enemies, do-
mestically or abroad, never militarised Norway. The international humanism, 
the pacifist tradition and the belief in strong international institutions re-
mained a part of the national identity. This forced the military to keep a very 
defensive and domestic focus, to secure strong national control of the armed 
forces and least but not last, to introduce a conscript system that secured a 
democratic defence.  
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The Military: ‘Never Again 9th April’5 
In the National Military Commission of 1946 it was clearly stated that so-
cietal groups opposed to the defence was a danger. It was declared that this 
had to be avoided through positive and negative means.  A national ‘will to 
defence’ was to be created. After having experienced invasion and occupa-
tion, hearts and minds of the people had one wish when it came to security: 
never again shall we be occupied; never again shall the international anarchy 
surprise us. The aim of the national security after the Second World War was 
frequently summarized in one phrase: ‘Never again 9th April’ (the date on 
the Nazi invasion 1940).  
The international developments were certainly important for the Norwe-
gian security policy. The failure of the negotiations over Germany’s future, 
the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and not least Stalin’s military ‘offer’ 
to Finland, made Norway enter the Cold Was by choosing side. The gov-
ernment approached the United Kingdom and the United States for support, 
and simultaneously increased the defence budget with 50% (Kristiansen, 
1996:41). In 1949 Norway signed the Atlantic Treaty (later NATO), thereby 
avoiding a bilateral relation with the Soviet Union of the Finnish kind 
(Berggrav, 1996:67). The need for a strong Defence was widely accepted, as 
well as the need for alliance with the Great Powers. The previous belief that 
Norway could avoid being dragged into in a European War theatre was gone. 
Neutralism was abandoned.  
These conclusions were far from evident at the outset, however. There 
was strong resistance to NATO membership in labour to begin with, as well 
as to anything that smelled of offensive capacities within the military. Typi-
cally, the most accepted and widely recognised part of the military was the 
new so-called home guard which was established in 1947. The aim of the 
home guard was to provide quick local mobilisation of lightly armed infantry 
in case of a surprise attack. The traditions of the ‘People’s Armament’ and 
the resistance movement during the war was evident. This was in reality a 
second army, a reserve in addition to the conscript army, with no offensive 
power. It was locally organised and indeed tactically oriented. From its 
establishment the home guard had numerous volunteers, and was widely 
recognised as an army of the people.  
Labour also put a great effort into bringing the state (and thereby the 
people) in control of the armed forces. During the Cold War the military 
came under more political scrutiny and control than ever before in history. In 
the same vein, a unique ‘Base Policy’ was developed which prohibited per-
manent Allied presence in Norway in peace-time. The purpose of this was 
mainly to ease the Norwegian public opinion, not the Soviet Union. The 
government was afraid to push and provoke the pacifically, isolationist, or 
left-oriented portions of the population too far.  
The concept of ‘total defence’ was introduced, preparing Norway for the 
kind of total war the rest of Europe had fought for decades already. The state 
and the nation thereby joined the armed forces in defending the territory.  
The conscription system was expanded, improved and modernised. In 1948 
12 months’ service was introduced, later expanded to between 9 and 15 
                                                     
5 The empirical material in this part mostly stems from Ulriksen, 2002 Chapter 4, unless 
otherwise stated.  
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months depending on defence wing. During most of the Cold War, for the 
first time in history, conscription, defined as a universally applied draft with 
widespread legitimacy, was applied in Norway. The reason for the large 
number of conscripts was just as much political as military, however. Nor-
wegian security policy was to a large extent based upon active nation-build-
ing, and the conscript system was regarded as a primarily institution in this 
regard. Through conscription it was believed that the military would secure 
its legitimacy in the people.  
Over the years, the armed forces also played down the violent aspects of 
the military and became almost like any other public sphere. Demands for 
over-time and additional pay during military exercises, the introduction of 
organisational language from the economical and private enterprise sphere, 
illustrates this. All of Europe became increasingly anti-militaristic towards 
the end of the Cold War and after, playing down heroism and military virtue 
as an ideal for the 21st Century. Humanism and political integration was re-
placing the gun. This fit the Norwegian tradition well.  
From the early 1950’s on the defence was focussed on the northern coun-
ties close to the border with the Soviet Union. The defence strategy was 
rather simple. It was about exhaustion. The Norwegian conscript army was 
to resist the Soviet invasion as long as possible and try to exhaust them and 
delay their progress further south. The aim was to resist until allied troops 
could come to rescue.  
In other words, even if the Cold War and the Soviet threat was the basic 
framework in which the Norwegian defence planning took place, it none-
theless had a domestic twist to its implementation. The point of reference 
was the Second World War and the Nazi occupation, and national support 
was rallied around the symbolism of the heroic ‘boys in the forest’, i.e. the 
home resistance.  
Furthermore, even if Norway had joined an international alliance 
(NATO) to guarantee its security, even this was interpreted as a domestic 
asset. Norway was considered a net-receiver of allied help, not a provider. In 
case of war, Norway expected allied reinforcement, but not to send troops 
abroad to aid allies. So even if Norway formally was prepared to aid any 
allied country, the de facto military planning never considered this an option. 
If it came to war with the Soviet Union it would be on all fronts. To remove 
or weaken the Norwegian northern frontline would not be an option in such a 
scenario, since the idea of a limited war was ruled out. 
Norway was an allied partner like the rest of NATO but this was only 
legally. Politically, popularly and militarily it was just another way of 
securing the national territory.  
The Power 
Modernity entered Norway with full force after the Second World War. With 
it came industry, the strong state, the infrastructure, the national identity and 
the solidarity. The state, the people and the military were united and the 
power was lying in this very nexus. Non of the three entities dominated the 
other, but constituted a unique ‘Norwegian imagined community’ embracing 
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almost all Norwegians. The few outsiders never represented a threat to this 
web but rather served to reinforce it.  
The united people gave the state and the military legitimacy, the state 
strengthened the people and the military, whereas the military united the 
people through conscription and reinforced the strong state through its com-
bination of a domestic focus and the international alliance in NATO.  
The power lay in the consensus, and the consensus was not primarily a 
result of the containment of the opposition in the fringes. The national con-
sensus stemmed from shared attitudes and interpretations of the recent ex-
perience of the threat the international lack of order could represent. This 
was based on a widespread solidarity emerging from the common suffering 
during the Nazi occupation and from a common belief in modernity and de-
mocratic standards. The people, united in a nation was closely connected to 
the state, it was the very legitimising foundation of everything the state did, 
at the same time as it was the state that was the main nation-building actor. 
As a result, the power of dominance was almost entirely replaced with a 
power of widespread legitimacy. The military was united with the state and 
the people through a shared identity. This constellation of power remained 
more or less intact till the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War and into 
the 1990’s it also remained relatively unchallenged, even if the radical 
changes in the world politics begun to have an impact on all three entities.  
21st Century Norway: An Open-Ended Security Discourse 
At the early 21st century the Norwegian armed forces are no longer mainly a 
national territorial defence force, but is about to become predominantly in-
ternationally oriented. Territorial defence of Norway seems more or less ir-
relevant since there is no visible threat to the territory. The Norwegian mili-
tary now has to prove its relevance, domestically as well as to the allies, and 
this is done through missions abroad. Such an international orientation is not 
new; as mentioned above, Norwegian ships and troops have operated abroad 
before. However, it is the first time since the people become the main legiti-
mising factor of the military. The consent of the people was of a far lesser 
concern in the 19th century than it is now. These days it appears that the 
state, people and the military, which were united in one identity during the 
Cold War, again are about to drift apart.  
The State and the People 
The post-Cold War international order remains in limbo. No new discernible 
enemy has emerged over the horizon and united the West, nor Norway, into 
a single unified defensive actor prepared to sacrifice itself if need be. The 
global economy is becoming increasingly integrated, and regional (if not 
global) political institutions are emerging to cope with it. The state is forced 
to surrender sovereignty to over- and inter-national bodies like the EU and 
WTO, but the state nonetheless remains the key political body for the citi-
zens. The Norwegian state, despite not being member of the EU, is as inte-
grated into the economical sphere and shares the very same security con-
cerns as the rest of the European continent.  
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What is strikingly new in the 21st century Europe is that state security 
(i.e. threats to the territorial sovereignty of the state) is about to become 
irrelevant. The chances of being occupied by a foreign power are minimal. 
The reason is not solely the disappearance of the Soviet Union or any similar 
geo-political threat, but that territorial control no longer is the only key to 
economical and political power. Even a possible future ‘evil dictator’ or a 
generally unstable regime in Europe will have problems occupying the ter-
ritory of another country since the gains achieved from it is far less than the 
expenses; that being political and economical. Territorial control or the state 
is simply not the sole key to power anymore (Cooper, 2003).  
Furthermore, the lack of a global ideological rift accompanied with mili-
tary assets has also vanished. The existential threat of an Armageddon has 
more or less disappeared. The Western political discourse is now largely 
about protecting status quo against various risks (Beck, 1992). In security 
terms it means that ‘War is no longer used to advance ‘goods’, but managing 
‘bads’’ (Coker, 2001:56). The end of grand ideologies and metaphysics 
leaves us (the West) with mainly one reason to fight wars: to protect what 
we have.6 
As a result, in the security discourse state security has now been supplied 
with such concepts as ‘societal security’ and ‘human security’ indicating a 
shift in focus from defending sovereignty and territory to protecting the civil 
population and central institutions from anything from pollution to terrorist 
attacks. Since nobody knows where and when this threat might strike, a 
security debate is constantly on-going and the state is to a lesser degree the 
sole actor to define threats and to respond to them. The discourse defining 
threats – and the appropriate response – is global and regional, and involves 
a wide variety of actors.  
The appropriate way of applying military force against such invisible 
enemies is hard to determine, and will also always be contested. Interna-
tional police cooperation appears to be just as important to combat e.g. ter-
rorism, making the state searching for relevant uses of its armed forces. 
At the same time the people, which at least since World War II was 
equivalent to the nation in Norway, has over the last decades become more 
fragmented and pluralistic. People are migrating, travelling and communi-
cating, and refugees and immigrants are settling. This has lead to various 
local, regional and de-territorialized identities. As a result, the Norwegian 
‘imagined community’ is not as dominant and stable an identity as it used to 
be. The nation has far from vanished but other collective identities play more 
significant roles in many people’s life. With different identities often comes 
somewhat different values and different solidarity. The extent of these dif-
ferences has until now remained limited, however, as most Norwegians 
share the basic democratic values, and trust the state institutions. But it can-
not be ruled out that the state at some point will need to more explicitly de-
fine what values it is based on, in other words which values and principles 
that ties the people to the state. The nation may no longer be sufficient. 
                                                     
6 Robert Kagan and others however, argue that this is mainly a European trend, whereas the 
United States still considers itself to have a ‘ideological mission’ for instance to promote 
democracy. See e.g. Kagan (2003) and Mead (2004). 
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Despite of a growing societal diversity, no deep ideological conflicts 
appear to be emerging. A part of the reason for this may be that the percep-
tion of social differences today not primarily follow economical lines like it 
did in the 1920’s and 30’s. The lack of a strong ideological alternative to the 
current liberal-democratic capitalist welfare state is also significant.  Thus, in 
spite of immigration and identity mixes, the society remains more united 
than it was before 1940. The domestic stability and security is currently not 
threatened. The majority wants to protect the status quo in one fashion or the 
other.  
Still, a number of societal changes are currently taking place in most 
Western societies, including Norway. Such things as secularisation, less re-
spect for authority, increased individualisation, single parenthood replacing 
the nuclear family, altered relationship between the sexes and changes in the 
male and female identity, all play a role in the relationship between the 
people and the military. First and foremost, it makes the people less united 
and willing to sacrifice themselves for others. Individualisation, meaning for 
instance self-realisation, career and personal identity, has over the last dec-
ades become a prime concern for most people. This however, also makes the 
will to sacrifice for something ‘higher’ a more obsolete thought (Cooper 
2003:51). Smaller families, better living conditions and higher life expectan-
cies have the same effects. One result is ‘zero-tolerance’ when it comes to 
casualties in war. As Coker (2001) points out, not only must the wars today 
have a humanitarian legitimacy, they also need to be fought in a humane 
way so that casualties are avoided – on both sides. Public opinion is crucial 
in today’s warfare, and the post-material and post-industrial public feel un-
easy about blood and violence.  
An increasingly fragmented population, with de-territorialized identities 
in flux, with international as well as national networks, focused on their own 
personal life and career, and with relatively high knowledge about develop-
ments in other parts of the world, cannot anymore be expected to provide the 
state a carte blanche in conducting international military operations. The 
state therefore needs to seek legitimacy, actively and constantly. The power 
of the people appears to be increasing in relation to the state, even if the 
people as such are becoming more fragmented. There is a constantly on-go-
ing discourse, over both what and who that constitutes a danger and over 
what to eventually do to face that risk. Hence, what signifies the contempo-
rary security situation is its dynamics, the never-ending discourse and 
power-struggle over the definition of risks and thereby the legitimacy of use 
of military (as well as judicial) force. 
The Armed Forces; Security Policy 
The Norwegian armed forces have also changed dramatically over the last 
years. From being a rigid, passive, mass mobilisation army, it has become a 
much more dynamic and operational organisation. It is first and foremost the 
international operations that have provided the basis of the armed forces’ 
new identity. However, the state’s ability to anchor this transformation in a 
new security concept has been rather awkward. Since it no longer is obvious 
and universally accepted what and who that represents a security threat, the 
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government has chosen to downplay the military and security related aspects 
of the international missions Norway has participated in. 
Instead, in most of the international operations over the last 10 years, the 
Norwegian state has been stressing the humanitarian side of the operations. 
The concept ‘humanitarian intervention’ as it developed in the 1990’s fitted 
well into Norway’s anti-militaristic self proclaimed non-oppressive humani-
tarian tradition. This was, and is, non–controversial and leans on the deep 
UN-foundations of the people and the pacifist and non-aggressive traditions 
from the 19th century. It also draws attention away from the long-term po-
litical consequences any military intervention has. 
A prime example is the Norwegian participation in NATO’s war against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. This represented a challenge for 
the government since the war had no UN-mandate, and thereby undermining 
the above mentioned image. The government therefore refused to label the 
bombardment ‘war’, insisting instead it was a ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
and a ‘limited military operation’. It feared to provoke the anti-militaristic, 
pacifist sphere of the public as well as undermining the strong UN-orienta-
tion in the Norwegian foreign policy self-image. It took four years after the 
end of the Yugoslavia war before the Prime Minster admitted that it had 
actually been a war. 
In Iraq Norway participated with troops until July 2004, but did not con-
sider itself as part of the occupational force. Humanitarian objectives were 
again put at the forefront to legitimise the mission. After having formally 
opposed the war, to significant public dismay by the US ambassador in 
Norway, the government was the first non-combatant state to join the peace-
keeping forces after the war. In all the subsequent debate the government 
was keen on downplaying the military aspects of the army stationed in Iraq, 
referring to it as a humanitarian mission, with a clearly different and ‘softer’ 
mandate than the occupational force. It is reasonable to believe that the pur-
pose of the government’s urgency to send troops was to bridge the relations 
with the USA after having abandoned it during the war. But that was never 
stated publicly. 
In Afghanistan the humanitarian aspect of the engagement was more 
convincing, since ISAF has a clear UN mandate. However, in Operation 
Allied Force, which is the US’ ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan and beyond, 
Norwegian participation was far more controversial from an international 
law perspective. Special forces and a wing of F-16’s were nonetheless de-
ployed with hardly any public or parliamentary debate. These missions took 
place with a high level of operational secrecy thereby probably avoiding too 
much public interest in, and questioning about, the operations.  
Strategic security has been a precondition all these interventions, but in 
Norway that has been played down publicly. The reason why Western pow-
ers intervened in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and Iraq is mainly because they 
considered the situation in these areas to be a crucial risk for their own so-
cietal security. The crises in these societies were regarded to have a direct 
impact on Western security (refugees, crime, terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction etc). The reason for the reluctant interest in the many crises on 
the African continent is the same; they are not considered to be directly 
linked to Western (societal) security (Ignatieff, 2003). 
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However, the strategic objective for the Norwegian state in the early 21st 
century appears simply to remain close to these allies; i.e. to participate in all 
major NATO (and increasingly EU-) operations and to particularly nurse the 
so-called ‘Atlantic relationship’, i.e. with the USA and the UK. It uncertain 
times, to keep up the good relations with our international allies appears to 
be the sole strategic security policy of Norway. Within the discourse, this is 
legitimised in two ways. The traditional version is that we need to go abroad 
to secure allied support for a future defence of Norway. The internationali-
sation of the military therefore basically is just a means to secure a tradi-
tional objective; the Norwegian sovereignty. It is state security with other 
means, or realism under a humanitarian veil. The futuristic version is that 
Norway now is an integral part of Western societal security environment and 
therefore need to protect it wherever a threat is emerging. Territory is irrele-
vant in this perspective. Such lines of argumentation however, are very rare 
in the Norwegian security discourse.  
That Norway now needs to go abroad, that Norwegians have to kill and 
die on another continent to secure national strategic security, appears to have 
been difficult to state publicly for the government. The humanitarian version 
is safer and less controversial. This is summarised in a slogan in the armed 
forces: ‘National defence, international commitment’. The security is still 
something domestic, and we go abroad to be show solidarity and to indi-
rectly secure our national territorial defence. The concept of societal security 
remains more or less absent in the Norwegian discourse.  
The New Military Identity 
The armed forces has gone a long way in redefining its role over the last five 
to ten years. The new buzz words are hi-tech, such as ‘net-centric warfare’, 
where the aim is to use information technology to make the organisation 
more operational, flexible and dynamic. The armed forces aim at being a 
result-oriented, effective and modern organisation, capable of co-operating 
with allied forces with the latest technology and operational tactics.  
Within the armed forces themselves, the anti-thesis to this model is con-
sidered to be the Norwegian Cold War conscript army. Within the ranks, the 
Cold War army is regarded to have been rigid, passive, a slow organisation 
with desk-officers without combat experience. The romantic reference to the 
WWII resistance is no longer the back bone of the armed forces as it was 
during the Cold War. As a result, the reference to the people, to the romantic 
images of local resistance and a widely applied conscription, is also severely 
weakened within the military ranks. The armed forces are not nation-builders 
anymore. 
The military today wish to prove itself through action. Only through in-
ternational missions can it prove to be truly professional. It cannot wait in 
the garrisons as before. The means thereby becomes the end for the military 
itself. Only through the international missions, from Bosnia to Kosovo to 
Afghanistan and to Iraq can the military now legitimise and demonstrate its 
relevance.  
Norwegian soldiers in these missions are for the most parts contracted 
conscripts. Conscription, according to the latest official strategic documents 
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from the Government,7 is to remain the back-bone of the military. The pur-
pose is twofold; to recruit personnel and to anchor the military with the 
people. According to the MoD and the military, conscription is needed for 
the military to get in touch with a wide selection of the young generation and 
hence thereby recruit them either to the military schools or to a contract for 
international missions. However, the conscription is limited in the sense that 
only those required by the military actually are drafted. The rest is let off 
with no duty at all. In a way, it is therefore ‘back to normal’, to the decades 
and the century before the Cold War, when the universality of the conscrip-
tion never was practiced. Only 40- 50% of the men are now drafted annually 
(44% in 2003, i.e. ca. 11000 men and some 400 volunteer women). Limited 
applications probably reduce the tensions significantly, since those opposed 
to the service are let off, just like they were in the 1920’s and 30’s. However, 
this time it is not the deep socio-economic-ideological divisions in the soci-
ety that has the potential of causing internal problems, but the above-men-
tioned de-militarization of society and hence a lack of feeling of existential 
threats within the people.  
The second official reason for conscription, that conscription secures ties 
between the people and the military is obviously weakened by the very lim-
ited number of actual draftees, and the fact that the focus is vague and inter-
national rather than clearly defined and national. This nevertheless point at 
an aspect which probably will become increasingly significant in the years to 
come. No matter how the military organise itself, the relationship to the civil 
society will be of crucial significance for it to survive. The need to anchor 
the military to the people is also increased by the fact that mandatory service 
abroad is about to be introduced for all officers, as the volunteering system 
not anymore is considered sufficient to guarantee enough personnel for the 
international missions. The result could be that the personnel on the interna-
tional missions would be less enthusiastic than today. The popular legiti-
macy of the mission itself will therefore be of crucial importance. 
As mentioned above, the strategy thus far has to a large extent been to 
play the humanitarian card to appease the wider public. The humanitarian 
legitimacy may work for a while in the civilian population, but the military 
itself has realised that the reality is somewhat different. In Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq the dangers differ, but is constantly present. The local 
population can be hostile due to anything from impatience of lack of socio-
economical progress, to being opposed to presence of what they consider to 
be the neo-colonial rulers or occupiers (Ignatieff, 2003: 24-25). 
Soldiers are not humanitarian workers. Soldiers cannot, like e.g. the Red 
Cross, intervene in a conflict without also interfering politically. Any mili-
tary intervention is by definition political, since it imposes a new power in 
the war theatre. The armed forces know that the missions not are only 
humanitarian, they feel the power they are imposing every day. They also 
know that where there is power there is resistance, and potential danger. 
They wish to be acknowledged for the order they provide and for their pro-
fessional job and not to be labelled humanitarian workers. 
                                                     
7 See ’St.prp.nr. 42 – Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005-2008’ Ch. 
6.3. 
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Hence the post-Cold War generation of officers and soldiers are devel-
oping a kind of warrior ethos. They are proud of their profession as soldiers, 
of their professionalism in their work. In the military schools traditional 
‘knight ethos’ are introduced aimed at building the character of the soldiers. 
The aim is to not loose control and degenerate into the methods of a ‘bar-
barian enemy’, to keep the moral high ground and develop a warrior’s virtue 
of justice, self-restraint and wisdom (Brunstad, 2004).  
What signifies soldiers compared to other professions, is the ability to use 
force. The military is supposed to be the last resort, the tool applied when 
everything else fails, in other words when the people and the state are facing 
existential threats. Only when threats are existential can soldiers be expected 
to kill and die to combat it. As demonstrated in the above pages, the defini-
tion of what is existential and to whom has varied over time, depending on 
the power relations in the society. What modernity brought is the idea and 
principle that this power ultimately rests with the people and is effectuated 
by the state. That has not vanished in the post-industrial society. Rather to 
the contrary, the armed forces are under constant scrutiny by the media and 
the public even at the most remote places in the world. Humane methods 
must be applied and the missions need a humanitarian anchor.  
But is humanism considered to be existential? Can Norwegian soldiers, 
having turned into warriors and combatants, sustain long-time stress and 
casualties in missions the state claims are humanitarian rather than existen-
tial?  
The Power 
In the early 21st century, the legitimising power for the application of the 
armed forces still formally rests with the people. There are limits to what the 
state could use the armed forces to without meeting severe popular resis-
tance. The principle of conscription remains as a back-bone of the Norwe-
gian defence concept, even if those conscripts who actually serves in the 
operations that defines the armed forces of today, are contracted. But despite 
conscription and compulsory international service for the officers, without 
public support, international military operations are impossible. Brute force 
can not be applied to discipline the armed forces, so popular legitimacy both 
from within the ranks as well as from the people remains crucial. Further-
more, the people are highly engaged in a security discourse which plays a 
crucial role in defining what represent a security risk, and the media provide 
them with news about (mostly negative) developments in the theatre. The 
power of the people is potentially immense, but the people are not what they 
used to be. It is split in different trans-national identities, individualistically 
and humanistic oriented, accepting no casualties and no use of excessive 
force.  
The state on its side is now in a position when security is no longer pri-
marily about the protection of the state’s integrity and territorial sovereignty, 
but about protecting an international status quo, an international order based 
on shared Western values, from various risks. The introduction of societal 
security and human security as new concepts brings the definition of security 
closer to the people, but the people are no longer territorially defined. This is 
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a historically new situation, and it could alter the relationship between the 
state and the military. That the armed forces not mainly are a tool for the 
protection of the state and its territory has never before been the case. Fur-
thermore, even if the state remains responsible for the application of armed 
forces, it is thoroughly weakened when it comes to defining legitimate tar-
gets for the force.  
The military has again become an active player, it defines possibilities 
and limitations, and develops its own profession identity, its ethos and tech-
nical capability. The military is constantly operating in international opera-
tions under foreign command, developing also here an international spirit 
together with the allies. The armed forces are in this respect more autono-
mous than it was during the Cold War, but not necessarily more so than in 
previous times. At the same time the armed forces can be regarded as being 
closer to the people since it in some respect has become more civilian. It is 
being used to promote civil values (humanitarianism), through civilian 
methods (no more nuclear weapons or excessive use of force) and by being 
closely scrutinised by the civil society.  
The introduction of Societal Security is in stark contrast the 19th century 
when the armed forces were purely a tool of the state. However, in Norway 
it appears that the state still primarily is using the military as a foreign policy 
tool, as a means to achieve international goodwill from allies, in case of 
future territorial threats. The Norwegian state engages in the international 
operations not mainly for societal security purposes, but for indirectly 
securing state security. During the Cold War the state could keep a domestic 
focus despite the internationalisation of the security policy through the 
NATO membership. Since Norway was a net-receiver of allied help, the 
military could build it legitimacy by integrating with the people. Now, when 
security explicitly must be secured abroad, this simplifying definition of 
national security is no longer durable. Security of today is something secured 
actively abroad, primarily by stabilising rogue and collapsed states. 
In this security environment, legitimising power cannot be secured 
through nation building or integration of identities. There are already clear 
indications that the future legitimacy to a large extent will be dependent 
upon the collective interpretations of global developments by the people. 
These collective interpretations are likely to be regional and/or international. 
The controversy over the war on Iraq in most European countries is a sign of 
this. This was a controversy over the degree of risk Iraq represented as well 
as what means that would be legitimate to use against such a risk. The West-
ern security discourse will be of increased importance, and the actors in-
volved in this discourse will play a crucial role for the possibility to accom-
plish military missions. As demonstrated in this article, in previous times the 
power legitimising the armed forces has shifted, not only in locus (between 
the state, people and the military) but also in the deeper foundations these 
three actors are operating in. Today, these deeper structures are developing 
faster than before. The security discourse is evolving in a much higher tempo 
than in previous times. And new actors and institutions are increasingly en-
gaged in the discourse.  
The popular resistance to the war over Iraq in Europe contrary to in the 
US has demonstrated, among other things, the importance of the media in 
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the formation of the security discourse. The interpretation of events, the real-
time coverage of developments, makes the people more involved. The state 
may consider the people to be ‘wrong’ or ‘seduced’ by the media, but it 
might be increasingly difficult for the state to act contrary to the opinion of 
the majority of the people. 
The power that legitimises the use of military force and military man-
power hence appears to be more in flux than ever before. The metaphysical 
foundation that united the people (the nation) is no longer relevant for inter-
national operations, the military itself is attempting to build its own ethical 
foundation, but cannot do so independently of the state and the people. The 
state is too weak to regain full control of its forces, but attempt to use it as an 
asset in the international arena under a veil of humanism. But humanism is 
not existential, the ‘global village’ has yet to replace the weakened national 
‘imagined community’. The armed forces could risk entering a serious legi-
timacy crisis unless a concept of existential risk again is developed within 
the security discourse. Even the ‘hottest’ contemporary risk, international 
terrorism, remains primarily within the judicial sphere, and the Norwegian 
military has yet to find its proper role relation to the police in this respect. 
International terrorism is also still to vague a threat to be considered an 
existential threat within the discourse.  
There are already those who argue that the international missions are cre-
ating more risk than security. The argument is that the security forces 
applied abroad, risk to create enemies that seek to strike back against Nor-
way or Norwegian property. The Madrid and London bombings are used as 
the prime example of this. Norway has already twice been mentioned in an 
Al-Qaeda communiqué as a potential target. In all places where Norwegian 
troops are deployed, a certain number of the local population consider the 
foreign military presence to be imperialism rather than humanism. This is 
irrespective of weather the missions have a clear UN-mandate or not. Lack 
of socio-economic and political progress may increase frustration locally and 
thereby also spread such sentiments. The result could, at some stage, be sud-
den rise in resistance, violence and hence casualties.  
How many casualties can Norway take before the very foundation of an 
operation is put into question by the people in the security discourse? Since 
the armed forces now base its legitimacy on operations rather than being 
national watch-guards, such questioning will ultimately also spill over to the 
armed forces in general. Hence, in the globalised media world the legitimacy 
of the armed forces could alter more or less over night.  
Conclusion 
Let us summarize briefly the general trends. In the earlier days, the state was 
embodied by the King who based his power on the military force. The 
people did not yet exist within the security discourse and were irrelevant ex-
cept for taxation and draft. Later, a social contract was established, at least 
formally, through the Constitution in 1814, making the people the judicial 
foundation of the state and hence the armed forces. This never materialised 
however, until the dawn of the Century, when the Nation became the domi-
nant identity of the people.  
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Then, when Norway gained international independence in 1905 the na-
tion had conquered the armed forces which helped it to also take control of 
the state by seceding from the Union with Sweden. However, prior to World 
War II, the armed forces were again controlled by the state as the nation was 
weakened and the people again were split in different fractions. This weak-
ened the military and its legitimate foundation.  
During the Cold War, the people became a full nation, and the very le-
gitimising foundation for the military as well as the state. The three also 
mutually reinforced each other and united in one shared national identity.  
Today, the relationship between the three is again altered. The three are 
moving away from each other. The people has to some extent increased its 
leverage over the military, but has itself become split, trans-national and 
sceptical towards the use of military force altogether. The military has 
become operational and is seeking to prove its relevance through successful 
missions. It is more dependent on the people than the state in this respect. 
The state attempts to use the military to nurse the relations to allies, but uses 
humanitarian phrases to legitimise it in the lack of national foundation. All 
three are involved in an on-going security discourse, where neither part can 
be said to be consolidated enough to dominate the others. 
There are several lessons to be learned from history. One is that even if 
the institutions remain, such as conscript-system, the very foundation upon 
which it rests has been changing significantly. Yesterday’s legitimacy may 
be irrelevant tomorrow. The armed forces’ has always been a contested 
organisation since it is violent by nature. Modernity made it legitimate, but 
only to a certain extent. In periods of peace the violent aspect has been 
played down (the Cold War), and in patriotic times it has been acceptable 
(1905). A ‘challenge’ today is that Norway and other Western societies have 
a very low threshold when it comes to tolerating violence. Fighting wars 
appears for many to be an alien activity.  
States or alliances of states, as well as the armed forces, may find this in-
creasingly difficult to handle. Pressure from allies for military assistance 
may put states in difficult positions if the people are opposing it. Abolishing 
conscription, as several Western powers have done years ago, will not in 
itself solve this challenge, since the military remains to be a representative of 
the state and the civil society. In other European countries the tendency is 
already visible: states are doing as states did prior to conscription: They hire 
specialists for the dirty work. In the pre-modern times, when popular resis-
tance from the draftees was a problem, mercenaries were hired to secure 
military success. Hence, if the armed forces in the future meet growing re-
sistance from people questioning the legitimacy of a mission, it could be 
tempting to use contracted soldiers instead. The use of Norwegian special 
forces in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan could be an example 
of this. However, even the special forces carry a flag on their uniform, they 
are not freelance mercenaries. They cannot entirely escape the scrutiny of 
the people even if they are operating in secrecy. These troops are also too 
small to fight entire wars, so if Norway (and Europe) wants to remain cap-
able of applying significant military force at some future security risk, the 
legitimate foundation of the regular armed forces, as perceived by the 
people, remains crucial. 
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The Norwegian military, if peripheral in Europe, are in this respect facing 
the same challenges as the rest of Europe. It is re-organising to become rele-
vant, applicable and efficient, but the legitimising foundation remains under 
constant pressure. There is no a priori answer to the why question; Why do 
we have military forces at all? The answers, even if convincing enough, 
nowadays have to be constantly updated, renewed and adapted. Strategic or 
local security, state, societal or human security, humanitarian support, risk 
management or containment are all concepts that can legitimise the use of 
armed forces. However, this is only possible if they are firmly anchored in 
the wider security discourse. The use of the military without such an 
anchoring may boomerang back on the state and armed forces itself with 
more devastating force than any other non-lethal force. Such a backlash may 
in itself be a domestic security threat.  
Handling security risks is indeed a risky business.  
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